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In The Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
RODERICK F. ELLIOTT, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
-vs.-
JOHN W. TURNER, Warden, 
Utah State Prison, 
Defendant-Respondent. 
Case No. 
10530 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE 
The appellant appeals from the judgment of the 
District Court of the Third Judicial District, denying 
his petition for writ of habeas corpus without hear-
ing. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The appellant filed a petition for writ of habeas 
corpus in the District Court of Salt Lake County, 
challenging his detention in the Utah State Prison 
by the respondent and assailing his revocation of 
Parole by the Utah State Board of Pardons. On Jan-
2 
uary 5, 1966, the Honorable Stewart M. Hanson 
Judge, entered a memorandum decision denyin~ 
the application for a writ of habeas corpus, indicat-
ing that the writ challenged administrative proced-
ures in the Prison and stated that the court was with-
out jurisdiction to consider the issues contained in 
the application for writ of habeas corpus. An appeal 
was subsequently filed and an appearance entered 
in the case by Mr. Robert L. Lord (R. 47). Subsequent-
ly, Mr. Lord has apparently indicated that he is un-
willing to represent the appellant on appeal, no 
reason for the withdrawal appears of record. The At-
torney General of the State of Utah wrote the ap-
pellant, indicating that he should request counsel 
from the Supreme Court and offered the assistance 
of his office in endeavoring to obtain counsel for the 
appellant. The appellant has recently advised the 
Attorney General, with a copy of the letter being 
sent to the Clerk of the Supreme Court, that he did 
not desire counsel and appellant has filed a brief 
prose. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The respondent submits that the decision of the 
trial court should be affirmed. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The appellant, a prisoner confined in the Utah 
State Prison, filed a complaint for writ of habeas 
corpus in the District Court of Salt Lake County. At-
tached to the petition as exhibits are numerous let-
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ters and correspondence. The basis upon which the 
appellant contends that he is entitled to habeas 
corpus are summarized on page 6 of his petition. He 
alleges, first that no warrant of arrest was issued at 
the time of his initial incarceration in the Salt Lake 
County Jail upon arrest for the violation of his pa-
ro~e. He further contends that he was not brought 
before the next regular board meeting of the Utah 
State Board of Pardons. This, apparently, is based 
upon a contention that the order entered by the 
Board of Pardons revoking the parole of the appel-
lant indicates that the case was continued until the 
meeting of the Board of Pardons held on the 20th 
day of July, 1965 (R. 9). The record, however, does 
show that the Board of Pardons recites that it was 
fully and completely advised in the premises and 
that the board had reviewed the evidence and 
heard and interviewed all interested persons, in-
cluding the appellant, and ordered the revocation 
of the appellant's parole. Third, the appellant con-
tends that he was not afforded counsel at the time 
of the hearing on his parole revocation. In addition, 
the appellant alleges that he was refused transcript 
and minute entries relating to the offense for which 
he was initially convicted. The record discloses 
that the appellant filed a motion and order on the 
28th day of July, 1965, asking that he have a tran-
script, minute entries and other documents cover-
ing his conviction in an effort to obtain a writ of 
error to the Utah Supreme Court (R. 14). Judge Aldon 
J. Anderson entered a order denying the appellant's 
request for transcript and minute entries on the 
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grounds that he had not shown any good cause fo~ 
their production (R. 16). On August 9, 1965, Judge 
Anderson wrote the appellant, inddicating that he 
would have to present a proper petition showing 
grounds to obtain the transcript. Thereafter, the ap-
pellant filed a motion and order for the appointment 
of counsel and for transcript, documents and minute 
entries in his case in which he merely alleged that 
the judgment and sentence were contrary to law 
and that he believed he was entitled to release on 
habeas corpus (R. 19). The appellant also contended 
that he had a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. s 1963 
for deprivation of federal civil rights. Judge Ander-
son again refused to grant an order for the furnish-
ing of the transcript to the appellant. Finally, the 
appellant contends that he did not have a fair and 
impartial hearing before the Utah State Board of 
Pardons. Appellant's petition does not detail the 
facts upon which he contends that he did not re-
ceive a fair hearing before the Board of Pardons. 
However, he does indicate that he couldn't have a 
fair hearing because the chairman of the Utah 
State Board of Pardons was chairman of the board 
of trustees of the Salt Lake Legal Defender's Asso-
ciation (Tr. 6). Further, the appellant contends that 
hearsay evidence was admitted at the time of his 
hearing before the Board of Pardons. 
The statement of facts set forth in the appellant's 
brief merely refer to Case No. 10548 and state that 
the cause is the same in this case as was presented 
in the other case. That case involved an application 
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for habeas corpus to this court which was denied 
because it involved the same matters pressed in 
this appeal. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT COMMIT ERROR 
IN DENYING THE APPELLANT'S COMPLAINT FOR 
WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS WITHOUT HEARING 
SINCE (1) THE COMPLAINT FAILED TO COMPLY 
WITH THE PROVISIONS OF THE UTAH RULES OF 
CIVIL PROCEDURE, (2) THE COMPLAINT FAILED 
TO STA TE A CLAIM FOR RELIEF. 
Rule 65B(f) (1), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, 
dealing with habeas corpus, provides that a com-
plaint for writ of habeas corpus must recite: 
"that the legality of the imprisonment or restraint 
has not already been judged upon a prior proceed-
ing; whether another complaint for the same relief 
has been filed and relief thereunder denied by any 
court***." 
In Davis vs. Hollowell. 216 Iowa 1178, 250 N.W. 
647, the Iowa Supreme Court indicated that a peti-
tion must recite that there has not been a previous 
adjudication or specify, if there has been a previ-
ous adjudication, the reasons for the denial of re-
lief in the previous adjudication. The court con-
cluded that this was mandatory and that a petition 
for writ of habeas corpus not containing the appro-
priate recitation could not be jurisdictionally en-
tertained. 
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Consequently, the trial court was justified in 
denying the appellant's complaint for writ of habeas 
corpus on the grounds that it failed to comply with 
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
It is submitted that the trial court acted properly 
in concluding that the complaint stated no sub-
stantive basis for habeas corpus. 
The appellant's contention that because a war-
rant for his arrest by the Utah State Board of Pardons 
was not issued until after he had actually been ar-
rested that he is entitled to habeas corpus cannot 
be sustained. There is an order attached to his peti-
tion showing that the appellant has appeared be-
fore the Utah State Board of Pardons and his pre-
viously granted parole recoked. The mere fact that 
there has been an arrest without a warrant would 
not prevent the Board of Pardons from assuming 
jurisdiction over the appellant and, thereafter, re-
voking his parole. Further, in the instant case, the 
appellant's petition indicates that prior to the time 
he was adjudicated to have violated his parole and 
his parole was revoked by the Utah State Board of 
Pardons, that a proper warrant of arrest had been 
issued. Under these circumstances, there is no basis 
for habeas corpus, Washington v. Renouf. 5 U.2d 
185, 299 P.2d 620. 
The appellant's contention that he did not ap-
pear before the Utah State Board of Pardons at the 
next regular meeting after his appearance on June 
30, 1965, at which time his parole was revoked, af-
fords him no basis for hctbeas corpus. The order at-
7 
tached to the appellant's complaint for writ of 
habeas corpus expressly indicated that the Board 
of Pardons had heard the witnesses, including the 
appellant, and that his parole was revoked. The fact 
that the board may continue the matter on its agenda 
to discuss or to consider does not require that the 
appellant be present. The order revoking the parole 
was entered and the failure to have the appellant 
otherwise appear before the board at some subse-
quent time did not in any way entitle the appellant 
to a writ of habeas corpus. Further, habeas corpus 
IS not an appropriate remedy to require the Board 
of Pardons to entertain anything the appellant has 
to say to it. Unrer these circumstances, there would 
be no basis for this court or any court to make in-
quiry into the actions of the Utah State Board of 
Pardons. See Rubin, The Law of Criminal Correc-
tion, p. 559. The appellant had his hearing and no 
further appearances before the board were re-
quired. 
The appellant's contention that he should have 
been furnished counsel to represent him at the pa-
role revocation proceeding cannot be sustained. 
The overwhelming weight of authority is to the ef-
fect that there is no right to counsel in a parole re-
vocation hearing. 
In Washington v. Hagen. 287 F.2d 332 (3rd Cir. 
1960), cert. denied 366 U.S. 970 (1961), Judge Good-
rich reviewed the course of decisions on the issue 
and reaffirmed the majority position that counsel is 
not required under any constitutional sense, nor 
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even under a policy determination, at parole revo-
cation hearings. The court said: 
"We think the conclusion reached below was right 
~owever, because we think the practice for more tha~ 
fifty years has been to allow a prisoner a hearing but 
n_ot ~ep~esentation by counsel. We think the prac-
tice is right because the matter of whether a prisoner 
is a good risk for release on parole, or shown himself 
not to be a good risk, is a disciplinary matter which 
by its very nature, should be left in the hands of 
those charged with the responsibility for deciding 
the question." 
The court went on to say with reference to the 
conduct of a parolee and his attempted progress to-
wards rehabilitation: 
"The progress of that attempt must be measured, not 
by legal rules, but by the judgment of those who 
make it their professional business. So long as that 
judgment is fairly and honestly exercised, we think 
there is no place for lawyer representation and law· 
yer opposition in a matter of revocation of parole.'' 
A similar position has been reached by several 
other federal courts. 
Recently, in Gaskins v. Kennedy, 350 F.2d 313 
(4th Cir. 1965), the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals 
ruled that an indigent defendant was not entitled to 
assigned counsel at a parole revocation proceeding. 
The court followed its previous ruling to the same 
effect in Jones v. Rivers, 338 F.2d 862 (3rd Cir. 1964). 
In Escoe v. Zerbst, 295 U.S. 480 (1935), the Su· 
preme Court indicated that the constitutional re· 
quirements of due process were not applicable tc 
probation revocation cases. 
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In Kadish, The Advocate and the Expert -
Counsel in the Penal Correctional Process, 45 Minn. 
L. Rev. 803 (1961), p. 817, it is stated: 
"The predominant view of the federal courts in pro-
bation revocation proceedings - that neither the 
specific constitutional guarantees appropriate to 
criminal trials nor the command of procedural jus-
tice of due process clause are applicable - has con-
sistently enough been extended to parole revocation 
matters as well.*** It follows, of course, that there 
is no constitutional right to counsel." 
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in Hiatt v. 
Campagana, 178 F.2d 42 (5th Cir. 1949), affirmed 340 
U.S. 880 (1950), ruled that there was no constitution-
al right to counsel at parole revocation proceedings. 
In Anderson v. Alexander, 191 Ore. 409, 229 P. 
2d 633 (1951), the Oregon Supreme Court ruled that 
an individual was not entitled to counsel at a paro]e 
revocation hearing. The court relied heavily upon 
the decision of McCoy v. Harris, 108 Utah 407, 160 
P.2d 721 (1945), to the effect that a parolee was not 
entitled as a matter of right to a notice of hearing 
for a revocation of parole. In a concurring opinion, 
Judge Rossman stated: 
"The board undoubtably takes into consideration im-
pressions of the selected parolee that it gained in the 
manner it just indicated. It analyzes symptoms and 
character rather than weighs evidence. It is required 
to determine a non-legal problem; that is, whether 
the parolee is about to become a recusant. A prudent 
performance of a board member's duty may call for 
intuition rather than knowledge of the rules or pro-
cedure and for training in the social sciences rather 
than a course of study in a law school." 
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It is submitted, therefore, that the trial court cor-
rectly denied the appellant's complaint for habeas 
corpus to the extent that it was based upon a con-
tention that he should have been afforded counsel 
at the time of his parole revocation proceedinJ, 
Parole is a matter of grace and the prisoner remains 
in custodia legis, McCoy v. Harris, supra, and con-
sequently, is still, technically, a prisoner. Further, 
a parole revocation hearing is not a court trial, but 
rather, an inquiry into the character and conduct of 
the parolee to see whether additional institutional-
ization is necessary. The need for counsel, in ~ c:on-
stitutional sense, is absent and, indeed, the pres-
ence of counsel may very well frustrate the tr'je 
rehabilitation of a parolee by causing the board to 
focus its attention on factors other than the rehabili-
tative needs of the individual parolee. There '.s 
nothing, of course, which would prevent the Boa;d 
of Pardons from allowing counsel to be present, 
which it does on many instances, but there was no 
obligation to see that counsel was appointed for 
the appellant. 
The appellant's contention that he is entitled to 
release by habeas corpus or consideration under 
writ of habeas corpus because of the failure of 
Judge Anderson to grant the appellant a copy of 
his trail transcript and allied papers cannot be su· 
stained. At no time did the appellant indicate any 
reasonable or just cause for the production of the 
documents. His allegations never indicated th:;'. 
there was any procedural or other irregularity in l:~s 
conviction. !t is apparent that appellant merely de 
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sired the papers and transcript to peruse to ascer-
tain if there was any basis that he might now col-
laterally attack his conviction. Under similar cir-
cumstances, the courts have been unanimous in 
denying motions of prisoners to have transcripts 
prepared at state expense. 
In United States v. Glass, 317 F.2d 200 (4th Cir. 
1963), the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals indicated 
that there was no right of a prisoner to have a tran-
script merely for his examination in order to deter-
mine whether there is a reasonable basis for apply-
ing for collateral relief. 
In United States v. Shoaf, 341 F.2d 832 (4th Cir. 
1964), the court adhered to its position. The court 
stated that an indigent prisoner is not entitled to a 
transcript of his criminal trial at government ex-
pense without a showing of a need for the transcript 
where he wants it merely to comb the record in 
hope of discovering some flaw. The court said this 
was true, even though the defendant indicated and 
alleged that he believed he was entitled to relief 
that he would seek by way of collateral attack on his 
conviction. It is apparent, therefore, that since the 
appellant was unable to show good cause to the 
court why the transcript should be prepared that 
there was no basis for a writ of habeas corpus on the 
allegation that there was a denial of a transcript. 
The appellant's final contention that he did not 
receive a impartial hearing before the Utah State 
Board of Pardons is not sustained. There are no 
facts indicating the appellant's failure to receive a 
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fair hearing, and the actual records, of which this 
court may take judicial notice, show that the ap-
pellant plead guilty to parole violations. The con-
tention that hearsay evidence was received is, of 
course, not a valid one, since hearsay is not ob-
jectionable in an administrative proceeding. Hack· 
ford v. Industrial Commission. 11 U.2d 312, 358 P.2d 
899 (1961: Cooper, State Administrative Law, Vol. i, 
p. 404, 410 (1965). The appellant's contention that 
the Honorable George C. Lattimer, Chairman of the 
Utah State Board of Pardons, could not sit on his 
case because he was a member of the Board of 
Trustees of the Salt Lake Legal Def ender's Associa-
tion, has no merit. That, in and of itself, evidences 
no bias, except possibly, a favortism towards de-
fendants. In any event, the allegation is wholly 
absurd and without merit. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the above, it is submitted that the 
trial court ruled correctly that the matters alleged 
in the appellant's petition raised only issues for ad· 
ministrative determination. This court should affirm. 
Respectfully Submitted, 
PHIL L. HANSEN 
Attorney General 
RONALD N. BOYCE 
Ass't. Attorney General 
Counsel for Respondent 
